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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant, Kenneth Johnson, was convicted of two counts 
of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by 
robbery, see 18 U.S.C. S 1951, and one count of use of a 
firearm during a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). 
 
The first robbery occurred on December 23, 1995, at 
Littman Jewelers in Cheltenham, Pennsylvania. An 
employee testified that he was at the front of the store 
placing jewelry in display cases when he saw three males 
enter the store (although more were implicated in this 
robbery). Two of the three, Nafis Murray and Darrell 
Williams, pleaded guilty to this robbery and testified 
against the third, appellant Johnson. They testified that 
Murray was armed with a bat, as was another co- 
defendant, William Cole. Cole stood near the entrance, 
while Johnson and Williams wielded sledgehammers to 
break open the jewelry display cases. After smashing the 
two jewelry display cases, they took diamond rings. During 
the robbery, Murray threatened to hit an employee with the 
baseball bat unless she put the phone down. 
 
The second robbery took place on March 19, 1996, at the 
Best Products, Inc., store located in Hampton, Virginia. An 
employee there testified that he saw four males enter the 
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store. One of them put a gun to the employee's head and 
told him not to say anything. The other three broke open 
jewelry display cases and stole jewelry before fleeing. Three 
co-defendants, Nafis Murray, Darrell Williams, and Ferrus 
Riddick, pleaded guilty to this robbery and testified against 
the fourth, Johnson. Williams testified that it was he who 
put a gun, owned by Johnson, to a security guard's head 
while Johnson smashed a jewelry display case with a 
sledgehammer. 
 
Johnson was tried for both robberies before a jury in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He was found guilty on all 
counts, and was sentenced to 146 months in prison. He 
appeals, arguing that the district court erred by: (1) 
enhancing his sentence four levels for use of a dangerous 
weapon during a robbery, see U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(D); (2) 
declining to conduct an in camera review of the presentence 
reports for Murray and Williams to check for impeachment 
material; (3) restricting defense questioning of Murray and 
Williams regarding other robberies they have participated 
in; (4) ruling the government's failure to disclose certain 
exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) until after trial 
was harmless error; (5) admitting testimony of Murray and 
Williams when special treatment they received might 
amount to payment in violation of the criminal gratuity 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 201(c)(2); (6) allowing testimony of an 
uncharged robbery allegedly involving Johnson; and (7) 
instructing the jury that it could consider Johnson's 
"immediate flight" following his indictment. 
 
We review the court's factual findings for clear error and 
have plenary review over conclusions of law. Our review of 
a district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines 
is de novo. See United States v. Weadon, 145 F.3d 158, 159 
(3d Cir. 1998). We review the court's decisions on in camera 
review, admission of evidence, and instructions to the jury 
for abuse of discretion. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
The district court calculated Johnson's sentence using 
the 1997 Sentencing Guidelines, which provide a base 
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offense for robbery of 20. See U.S.S.G.S 2B3.1(a). This base 
level may be enhanced if a weapon was used during the 
robbery. U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2) provides: 
 
       (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) 
       if a firearm was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; 
       (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or 
       possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous 
       weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (E) if 
       a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or 
       possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of 
       death was made, increase by 2 levels. 
 
The terms "brandished," "dangerous weapon," and 
"otherwise used" are defined in the commentary to U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1. See U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1, Commentary, application 
note 1. 
 
       (c) "Brandished" with reference to a dangero us weapon 
       (including a firearm) means that the weapon was 
       pointed or waved about, or displayed in a threatening 
       manner. 
 
       (d) "Dangerous weapon" means an instrument c apable 
       of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Where an 
       object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was 
       brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat the object as 
       a dangerous weapon. 
 
       (g) "Otherwise used" with reference to a dan gerous 
       weapon (including a firearm) means that the conduct 
       did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was 
       more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a 
       firearm or other dangerous weapon. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1, commentary, application note 1. 
 
When the district court enhanced Johnson's sentence 
four levels because he "otherwise used" a dangerous 
weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), it only 
considered the conduct in the Littman Jewelers robbery, 
where no guns were used. Johnson argues that no 
enhancement was warranted because no dangerous 
weapons were used in this robbery, or in the alternative 
that the proper enhancement was three and not four levels 
under U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) because he merely 
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"brandished" a sledgehammer, but did not "otherwise use" 
it during the robbery. 
 
B. 
 
As an initial matter, we reject Appellant's contention that 
a sledgehammer, wielded in the course of a robbery and 
used to smash open display cases in front of bystanders, 
cannot be considered a dangerous weapon. Under the 
circumstances, it clearly was "an instrument capable of 
inflicting death or serious bodily injury." U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1, 
application note 1(d). So was the baseball bat carried by 
one of Johnson's co-defendants. Appellant argues that 
because any object may conceivably be used to harm 
someone, we would render the definition of a "dangerous 
weapon" devoid of meaning if we extended it to a 
sledgehammer. However, a common-sense look shows this 
is not true. 
 
A baseball bat, carried onto the baseball diamond, is 
clearly a sport implement and not a dangerous weapon. 
Likewise, a sledgehammer, properly employed on a 
construction site, is clearly a tool. But when these items are 
carried into the scene of a robbery, and employed to 
threaten bystanders, they just as clearly become dangerous 
weapons. Put another way, does it matter if a robber uses 
a switch-blade knife or a steak knife? We think not and 
opine that the distinction would likely not be significant to 
any potential victims of either. Both are dangerous weapons 
when used in a robbery. In the context of this case, the 
sledgehammer and the baseball bat both fit the definition of 
a "dangerous weapon" contained in U.S.S.G.S 1B1.1, 
application note 1(d), and the circumstances demonstrate it 
was reasonable for the District Court to treat them as such. 
 
C. 
 
We turn next to the question of whether these dangerous 
weapons were merely "brandished," justifying a three level 
sentence enhancement under S 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), or whether 
they were "otherwise used" in the course of the robbery, 
warranting a four level enhancement under S 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). 
Whether Johnson's sentence should have been enhanced 
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by three or four levels depends on how one interprets the 
Guidelines. 
 
Courts of Appeals have generally distinguished between 
the general pointing or waving about of a weapon, which 
amounts to "brandishing," and the pointing of a weapon at 
a specific victim or group of victims to force them to comply 
with the robber's demands. In essence, "brandishing" 
constitutes an implicit threat that force might be used, 
while a weapon is "otherwise used" when the threat 
becomes more explicit. See United States v. Gilkey, 118 
F.3d 702, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (gun was "otherwise 
used" to force victims to move, despite lack of evidence 
regarding physical contact with victims or use of verbal 
threats); United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 
1994) (knife was "otherwise used" to force victim to move); 
United States v. Hamilton, 929 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 
1991) (knife was "otherwise used" when intentionally held 
to victim's throat as robber made verbal threats); United 
States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1997) (gun 
was "otherwise used" when pointed at victims during bank 
robbery to ensure their compliance). But see United States 
v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 1994) (pointing firearms 
at customers during bank robbery, ordering them tofloor, 
and threatening to kill them if they did not comply 
amounted to "brandishing"). 
 
We too, have considered the question of whether a 
firearm was "otherwise used" during a robbery, or merely 
"brandished." We reasoned that a firearm is "brandished" 
when it is waved about in a generally menacing manner 
during a robbery. See United States v. Johnson, 931 F.2d 
238, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1991). When, however, that firearm is 
leveled at the head of a victim, and especially when this act 
is accompanied by explicit verbal threats, we have had no 
difficulty determining that the firearm was"otherwise 
used." Id. 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
which held that 
 
       a person may "brandish" a weapon to "advise" those 
       concerned that he possesses the general ability to do 
       violence, and that violence is imminently or 
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       immediately available. . . . Altering this general display 
       of weaponry by [for instance] specifically leveling a 
       cocked firearm at the head or body of a bank teller or 
       customer, ordering them to move or be quiet according 
       to one's direction, is a cessation of "brandishing" and 
       the commencement of "otherwise used." 
 
United States v. LaFortune, ___ F.3d ___, No. 99-1059, 1999 
WL 701674, at *4 (1st Cir. Sept. 15, 1999). Pointing a 
weapon at a specific person or group of people, in a manner 
that is explicitly threatening, is sufficient to make out 
"otherwise use" of that weapon. We hold this is true when 
any dangerous weapon is employed: It need not be a 
firearm. 
 
Other courts have held that verbal threats are not always 
required to make out "otherwise use" of a weapon. Some 
have held that explicit threats may be made either verbally, 
or through conduct alone. See United States v. Nguyen, ___ 
F.3d ___, No. 98-40066, 1999 WL 740439, at * 5 (5th Cir. 
Sept. 22, 1999). Here, however, Johnson's sentence was 
properly enhanced even were we to require verbal threats. 
In addition to Johnson's use of a sledgehammer to smash 
open display cases, one of the co-defendants wielded a 
baseball bat in a threatening manner and testified that he 
used it to intimidate people in the store. This co-defendant 
testified that on one occasion he held the baseball bat up 
high and told an employee to put the phone down or he 
would break her neck, or "knock her damn head off." 
Johnson's co-defendant with the baseball bat thus clearly 
"otherwise used" that dangerous weapon to facilitate the 
robbery when he told a specific employee to put the phone 
down, and backed up his command by raising the bat and 
threatening to harm or kill her with it. 
 
The District Court was entitled, for sentencing purposes, 
to consider Johnson's behavior and that of his co- 
defendants. See United States v. Nguyen, ___ F.3d ___, No. 
98 40066, 1999 WL 740439, at *4 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) 
(Sentencing adjustments may include "all reasonably 
foreseeable acts and omissions in furtherance of the jointly 
undertaken criminal activity.") (citing clarification in 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), effective Nov. 1, 1998); United 
States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1989) 
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("[Defendant] may still have been properly subject to an 
enhanced sentence based on the possession of firearms by 
[co-defendants] without individually possessing a firearm 
under the theory of co-conspirator liability.") (citing 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 90 
L. Ed. 1489 (1946)). Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 
1129, 1135 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting in context of finding 
criminal liability that facts of case would also allow 
sentence enhancement of one defendant based on firearm 
possession by another). We hold that from the combination 
of factors we have described, a dangerous weapon was 
"otherwise used" at the robberies, giving sufficient support 
to the District Court's decision to enhance Johnson's 
sentence to level 4. 
 
In addition, the District Court may enhance Johnson's 
sentence because he "otherwise used" a weapon, even 
though he did not make the explicit verbal threat, because 
his conduct was "equally coercive and threatening." 
LaFortune, 1999 WL 701674 at *3, citing United States v. 
Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1999). Johnson did 
not merely stand at the front of the store holding the 
sledgehammer for some legitimate purpose. He used it to 
smash jewelry cases in front of customers and employees, 
while his co-defendant held a baseball bat aloft to"break 
necks" or "knock heads off." We have no doubt that the 
customers and employees might well have felt coerced and 
threatened by this conduct. And, we have no doubt at all, 
that it amounted to more than the mere brandishing, 
display or possession of a dangerous weapon. See U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.1, application note 1(g). The District Court was 
entitled to give, and Johnson richly deserved, the four level 
enhancement he received under U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1 (b)(2)(D). 
 
II. 
 
None of the remaining issues raised have merit, and we 
will dispose of them summarily. First, the government 
provided Johnson with large amounts of potentially 
exculpatory material prior to trial, as required by Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 
(1963). The defense was allowed to cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses on many areas affecting credibility. 
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Despite an unexplained late Brady disclosure, there is no 
reasonable probability that it would have changed the 
trial's outcome. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383-84, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). 
The additional impeachment evidence would not have put 
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict, and would have been merely 
cumulative. See Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1035, 143 L. 
Ed. 2d 44 (1999). Thus, the decision on whether or not to 
hold an in camera review of this material was well within 
the district court's discretion. 
 
Next, Johnson's arguments regarding the criminal 
gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. S 201 (c) (2), are without 
foundation, and we have already rejected them in United 
States v. Hunte, ___ F.3d ___, No. 97-1987, 1999 WL 
649627 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 1999). 
 
The government offered evidence of the prior robbery for 
the purpose of showing a common plan under Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b). This is a legitimate reason to introduce this 
evidence, and the prior robbery was clearly established. We 
favor the admission of such evidence, "if relevant for any 
other purpose than to show a mere propensity or 
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the 
crime." United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S. Ct. 577, 58 L. Ed. 2d 657 
(1978); see also United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 
1050 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134, 103 S. Ct. 
3117, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1370 (1983). Johnson's bad acts were 
used for a proper purpose that was not substantially 
outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 
403. "In weighing the probative value of evidence against 
the dangers . . . in Rule 403, the general rule is that the 
balance should be struck in favor of admission." United 
States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir. 1980). Once 
again, the decision whether to admit it was within the 
district court's considerable discretion. 
 
Finally, there was both direct and circumstantial 
evidence of Johnson's immediate flight. Following Johnson's 
indictment, Special Agent Stephen J. Heaney of the FBI 
began searching for him. While visiting the homes of 
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Johnson's friends and relatives, Agent Heaney advised 
these people that a warrant had been issued for Johnson. 
Indeed, appellant's own words indicated a conscious 
awareness of the crimes with which he was charged -- he 
admitted to one David Barberich, a police dispatcher, that 
he knew he was sought by the FBI. Johnson even told 
Barberich that Agent Heaney was the contact person for his 
case. Thus, it was well within the district court's discretion 
to give the immediate flight instruction. 
 
III. 
 
In sum, we reject appellant's arguments on every 
allegation of error and conclude that the District Court did 
not err. We will affirm. 
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